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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE| STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Cage No. 860331-CA

JAMES R. HOWLAND/

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE C^SE
This appeal is from a judgment against James Ronald Howland
for Attempted Aggravated Assault/ a Class A Misdemeanor/ in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 and $76-4-11)1 (1953 as
amended).

See Addendum A.

A jury found Mif*. Howland guilty

following a trial on October 9th / 19b0, in the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah/ the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson/ Judge presiding.

The Court sentenced Mr. Howland to

serve 12 months in the Salt Lake County Jail and pay a fine of two
thousand five hundred dollars.

The Court stayed the twelve month

jail sentence and placed Mr. Howland on probation for a period of
one year.

Pursuant to the terms of such probation/ the Court

required Mr. Howland to serve six months in the county jail and
complete other terms and conditions.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of July 6, 1986 at approximately 10:00 p.m./
an altercation took place between Daniel Wlayne Elliston/ a shift
manager at the McDonalds fast food franchise located at 700 East and

200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the appellant, James R.
Howland.

At the time of the incident, Mr. Elliston had worked at

McDonalds for n year and a half, earning four dollars an hour (R.
155, 159). He testified at trial that his duties included assuring
that company safety and security standards were met (R. 155).
Specifically, he disclosed that the company employs a policy of
holding food for only ten minutes after it is prepared, and throwing
all food away if it is not sold within ten minutes (R. 155, 159).
Mr. Elliston indicated that the disposal of food after ten minutes
was prompted by health and sanitary concerns since after that ten
minute period, the food would "start getting diseases on it" (R.
155, 159). Food that is thrown away is taken to the trash dumpster,
known as "the corral", immediately behind the restaurant.

The

corral is a brick enclosed area, large in size, containing a
dumpster accessible from a gate across the front and an open
entrance on the side (R. 156-58).
The brick corral is posted with a sign which reads,
"Warning.
157-58).

Garbage in the dumpster is contaminated.

Keep Out."

(R.

Mr. Elliston testified that the purpose of the sign is to

prevent garbage from being taken out of the dumpster (R. 159).
One of Mr. Elliston's duties was to make a security check
approximately once every hour of both the inside and outside of the
store including the corral area (R. 162, 197). Mr. Elliston
testified that during these security checks, it is a common
occurrence that there are persons in the corral at the dumpster.

He

stated, "one in four times I go out to the corral I have to kick
somebody out of the corral" (R. 197). He added, "There is [sic] a
lot of transients in the area" (R. 197).

- 2 -

Mr. Howland, the appellant, is a tiransient. At one point
during his testimony he characterized his lifestyle as "living on
the streets, skid row,

, Salvation Armjf, the Rescue Mission, the

Men's Shelter, Pioneer Park" (R. 272-73).

Mr. Howland was aware of

McDonalds' policy of throwing food in the dumpster, and he testified
that "McDonalds is far more wasteful than most other fast food
restaurants" (R. 289).
On July 6, 1986, around 10:00 p.m., Mr. Howland was in the
dumpster area behind the McDonalds on 700 East and 200 South (R.
287).

He testified that he was attempting to get a plastic bag full

of refuse out of the dumpster, hoping to retrieve some food.
Mr. Elliston, along with a second employee, made a security
check around 10:00 p.m. that same night (R^ 160). As Elliston
entered the corral area, he saw Mr. Howland trying to hide by the
back of the dumpster (R. 162, 165). Mr. EjLliston instructed Mr.
Howland to leave (R. 164). Mr. Howland responded that Mr. Elliston
did not have "any right to tell him to get out of there" (R. 164).
Mr. Elliston asked and instructed Mr. Howlknd to leave four or five
times before he finally complied (R. 289). Mr. Howland testified
that Mr. Elliston had to ask him that many times because he was
irritated over so much wasted food being tlhrown away (R. 289-90).
Both men accused the other of beimg belligerent in the
conversation IR, IbS-66, 262-63).

As they left the corral area, Mr.

Howland checked the name tag of Mr. Elliston and asked him if he had
a family (R. 166, 263)

At this juncture, the stories diverge. Mr.

Elliston claims that Mr. Howland threatened to kill his family,
stating that Mr. Howland's words were, "I am going to find your

house and kill your family."

(R. 166, 225). Mr. Elliston then

testified that Mr. Howland "came back like he was going to hit me,
and so I hit him" (R. 167). Mr. Elliston testified that he hit Mr.
Howland before Mr. Howland could hit him and that he hit Mr. Howland
four or five times in the face, but Mr. Howland never landed a blow
as Mr. Elliston blocked all attempts (R. 183-84).

According to Mr.

Elliston, while he was hitting Mr. Howland, he was telling Mr.
Howland that he was placing him under citizen's arrest (R. 187).
Mr. Howland then ran in the direction of the Smith's Food King
approximately two hundred and fifty feet away (R. 167-68).
Mr. Howland testified that he never threatened Mr. Elliston
(R. 295). Mr. Howland stated that he merely gave him advice about
talking to people politely and not being so rude and insulting
because it would get him into serious trouble some day (R. 291-93).
Mr. Howland testified that Mr. Elliston had misinterpreted what he
had said to be a threat (R. 292-93).
Mr. Howland testified he did not make a gesture to strike
Mr. Elliston and that he ducked away from Mr. Elliston after
Elliston hit him several times and then Howland walked away at a
fast walk (R. 267). Mr. Howland stated that after he got twenty
feet away, he and Mr. Elliston exchanged words; Mr. Howland laughed
at Mr. Elliston, who then chased Howland in a threatening manner (R.
267-68).
Mr. Elliston's testimony also indicates that Mr. Howland
had "a twenty foot head start" before he chased him (R. 189).

Mr.

Elliston caught up with Mr. Howland in front of the Smith's Food
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King door where Mr. Elliston grabbed Mr. Hokland from behind,
wrestled him to the ground, and placed him in a headlock (R. 190-92).
Robert Kilburn arrived at the Smith Food King parking lot
and observed the wrestling (R. 200). He ap|proached the two when Mr.
Elliston was on top of Mr. Howland holding Ihim in a headlock (R.
202).

Mr. Kilburn testified that Mr. Howlaind had his hand on the

handle of the hunting knife and had pulled it approximately five
inches out of the sheath (R. 217-18).

He testified there was no

stabbing motion or lunging (R. 218). Mr. Rowland testified that he
did not take the knife out of its sheath.

Instead, he had his hand

on the knife while it was still in the sheath because he was worried
that Elliston would grab the knife and use it against him.

When

Kilburn grabbed Howland's hand, he pulled Rowland's arm and the
knife came out of the sheath (R. 270-272).
After grabbing Howland's arm, Mr. Kilburn placed his knee
in Mr. Howland's stomach and squeezed Howland's wrist until he
dropped the knife (R. 214-18).

Mr. Kilburn gave the knife to the

Smith's Food King Manager (R. 218). Mr. Elliston continued to hold
Mr. Howland in a headlock until police arrived (R. 190).
The police took Mr. Howland into Custody and charged him
with aggravated assault.

Through his counsel, Mr. Howland moved for

the charges to be dismissed (R. 108) (Addendum B ) . The Court took
the motion under advisement and later denied it (R. 135).
the close of the state's case, defense counsel moved the
Court to dismiss the charges, arguing that the state failed to
present a prima facie case (R. 242). The (pourt denied the motion
(R. 245-46).
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Defense counsel moved that Mr. Howland's prior convictions
be excluded from evidence according to Rule 609(a) (R. 246). The
Court denied the motion (R. 256). The trial court, however, did
exclude prior convictions of Mr. Elliston over objection of counsel
(R. 282-83).

The Court instructed the jury as to flight by a

defendant after the commission of a crime.

Defense counsel objected

to such instruction (R. 337).
The jury returned from deliberations with a guilty verdict
on the lesser included offense of attempted aggravated assault (R.
338).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On appeal Appellant, James R. Howland first contends that
the trial court erroneously denied Mr. Howland's pre-trial motion to
dismiss the charges against him.

Mr. Elliston claimed to effect a

citizen arrest of Mr. Howland but did not have probable cause to do
so.
Mr. Howland next alleges that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in denying his motion to exclude prior convictions
and subsequently excluding the prior convictions of Mr. Elliston,
the state's primary witness.

The trial court erred in applying Rule

609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and moreover was inconsistent
in applying the rule.
Mr. Howland also claims the trial court erred in failing to
dismiss the charge of aggravated assault in that the State had
failed to establish the elements of the charge.
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In addition, Mr. Howland contends that the trial court
committed reversible error in instructing the jury regarding flight
after the commission of an offense in that the evidence did not show
that a flight occurred after the commission of the crime and the
content of the instruction was faulty since it did not discuss two
important areas regarding flight.
Finally, Mr. Howland contends that the cumulative effect of
the errors at trial denied him his right to a fair trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
MR. HOWLANDfS PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS.

Prior to trial, Mr. Howland filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against him (R. 108). See Addendum B.

The Court took the

motion under advisement and later denied it (R. 135).
Mr. Howland asserts that Mr. Ellis ton, a McDonalds shift
manager, possessed no probable cause to eff ect a citizen's arrest
over him.

As the arrest was attempted with out probable cause, Mr.

Howland was within his rights to resist an unlawful arrest.

In the

alternative, Mr. Howland contends that if Mr. Elliston did have
probable cause, he only had probable cause to believe he had
committed a trespass, an infraction on these facts.

An infraction

does not warrant incarceration as indicated in Utah Codf Ann.
§76-3-205; therefore, it is unreasonable t6 arrest an infraction
violator.

Accordingly, Mr. Howland requests this Court to reverse

the decision of the trial court.
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A.

MR. ELLISTON DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ARREST MR. HOWLAND FOR ANY CRIME.

At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Elliston articulated the
possible bases for the claimed citizen's arrest.

He testified that

he was attempting to place Mr. Howland under citizen's arrest for
the crimes of malicious mischief, threats against his family and
perhaps trespass (R. 113).
The criminal mischief statute is found in Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-106 and is inapplicable to the facts in this case.
Section 76-6-106 provides in pertinent part:
76-6-106. Criminal mischief.—(1)
commits criminal mischief if:

A person

(a) Under circumstances not amounting to arson,
he damages or destroys property with the
intention of defrauding an insurer; or
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully tampers with
the property of another and thereby:
(i) Recklessly endangers human life; or
(ii) Recklessly causes or threatens a substantial
interruption or impairment of any public utility
service; or
(c) He intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the
property of another.
(d) He recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile
or other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus,
airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car or caboose,
whether moving or standing.
The facts in this case do not fit within any of the provisions of
§76-6-106 since Mr. Howland did not intentionally tamper with,
destroy or damage property as proscribed in the statute.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-107 criminalizes the use of
terroristic threats.

That section provides in pertinent part:

76-5-107. Terroristic threat. (1) A person
commits terroristic threat if he threatens to
commit any offense involving violence with intent:
(a) To cause action of any sort by an official
or volunteer agency organized to deal with
emergencies; or
- 8 -

(b) To place a person in fear of [imminent
serious bodily injury; or
(c) To prevent or interrupt the occupation of a
building, room; place of assembly; place to which
the public has access; or aircraft|, automobile,
or other form of conveyance.
Subsections 1(a) and 1(c) are inapplicable to the facts in
the present case.

Subsection K b ) provides that a person commits a

terroristic threat if he threatens to commi t any offense involving
violence with intent to place a person in flear of imminent serious
bodily injury.

According to the state's wi|tnesses,

threatened to kill Mr. Elliston's family.1

Mr. Howland

(R. 112, 166 ,, I I r

188, 225).
Since the threat was of future haifm, the family was not
present at the time the statement was madej and Mr. Howland did not
know where they were (R. 45-46), Mr. Elliston could not have had the
requisite fear of imminent serious bodily injury as required by the
terroristic threat statute.

Accordingly, this statute could not

have been used to justify the arrest of Mrj Howland by citizen
Elliston.

1

At the pretrial motion hearing, the prosecutor clarified Mr.
Elliston's preliminary hearing testimony regarding the threat. The
prosecutor stated "I will kill your family
. . . Those are the words I wrote down at the preliminary hearing
and they are not vague. They were exactly)those words" (R. 112) At
trial, after the parties argued the motion to dismiss, Elliston
testified that Howland threatened both him and his family. However,
when asked by the prosecutor to clarify the exact words used,
Elliston acknowledged that Howland had threatened to kill only the
family (R. 166-7). See also R. 171, 188. Mr. Hervey, a McDonalds
employee who witnessed a portion of the altercation between Elliston
and Howland, testified that Howland said "J am going to qet your
family" (R. 225).

The third theory utilized to support the citizen arrest is
trespass which is found in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206.

Depending on

the factual context of the alleged trespass, the actions of the
trespassor may be categorized as either a Class B misdemeanor, a
Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction.

Subsection (2Mb) is the

only possibility that applies to the facts in the present case.

It

provides that:
knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he
enters or remains on property as to which notice
against entering is given by: (i) personal
communication to the actor by the owner or
someone with apparent authority to act for the
owner; or (ii) fencing or other enclosure
obviously designed to exclude intruders; or (iii)
posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the
attention of intruders.
Subsection point (3) indicates, however, that a violation of (2)(b)
is an infraction.

Thus, the only possible violation committed by

Mr. Howland at the dumpster was an infraction trespass.
B.

ARRESTING AN INDIVIDUAL FOR AN INFRACTION
CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE SEIZURE AND IS
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

An individual convicted of an infraction may not be
imprisoned, but may be subject to fine, forfeiture, disqualification
or any combination as part of a sentence for committing an
infraction.

See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-205 (1953 as amended).

While

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-205 does not specifically state that an
individual suspected of committing an infraction cannot be arrested,
such an interpretation is reasonable in light of public policies,
the language of the statute, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution.
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An arrest is a seizure of the persbn (Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). Permitting a person to be arrested and have his
liberty restrained when that same liberty c|annot be restrained if
ultimately convicted is unreasonable and viplative of the provisions
in the Utah and United States Constitutions which protect an
individual against unreasonable seizures of| the person.
In State v. Klinker, 537 P.2d 268 (Wash. 1975), a person
was arrested for <j civil paternity claim*

The court held that such

an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment siri ce it was not reasonable
to arrest someone for a civil matter.
Although an infraction is distinguishable from a civil
paternity action, jail is not a permissible punishment in either
circumstance and, therefore, the holding in Klinker that an arrest
violates the Fourth Amendment extends to this situation.
In a concurring opinion in Gustafgon v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973)(Stewart, J. concurring), the late Justice Stewart
suggests that the defendant in the case might have made a persuasive
claim that a custodial arrest on a minor traffic offense violated
the defendant's rights under the Fourth ancfl Fourteenth Amendments.
Finally, in Allen v. Burke, 690 F|2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982),
the circuit court discussed whether a magistrate could be held
liable for attorney fees in a civil rights action.

The circuit

court did not question but rather accepted the basic underlying
premise from the district court who had declared as unconstitutional
the practice of incarcerating persons for i(ion-incarcerable offenses.
In State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1978), the court
held that as a matter of public police cusjpodial arrest for minor
- 11 -

traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if
the defendant signs the promise to appear.

While the factual

circumstances are admittedly distinct from the case at bar, the
basic premise is applicable to both contexts.

A violation of public

policy occurs when someone is arrested and taken into custody on an
offense for which the punishment for that offense would not allow
imprisonment.
In the present case, where Mr. Howland did not commit a
jailable offense at the dumpster, any attempt by Mr. Elliston to
arrest him was unlawful.
C.

APPELLANT HAD A RIGHT TO RESIST THE UNLAWFUL
CITIZEN ARREST.

As previously outlined, the action taken by Mr. Elliston
after Mr. Howland withdrew from the dumpster area and retreated from
the scene of the initial altercation was unlawful.

An angry Mr.

Elliston pursued Mr. Howland, grabbed him from behind, wrestled him
to the ground and placed him in a headlock so that Mr. Howland could
not move (R. 190, 192).

Elliston told Howland he was placing him

under arrest, but such an arrest was unlawful since Howland had not
committed a jailable offense.
In State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a statute which made a person guilty of
interfering with a police officer if they resisted an arrest,
whether it was lawful or not, was unconstitutional.

From that

action one may infer that it is lawful to resist an unlawful
arrest.

The replacement statute to the one held unconstitutional,

Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305, now limits the interference with a police
- 12 -

officer to only those situations where the factor has knowledgef or
should know, that the police officer is seejking to effect a lawful
arrest.

(See Addendum C ) .
If a person may resist a police officer's unlawful arrest,

resisiting an unlawful citizen's arrest also seems permissible.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Howland's
pre-trial motion to dismiss.

This Court should therefore reverse

the subsequent conviction of Mr. Howland and remand the case to the
trial court to dismiss the charges.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY DENYING MR. HOWLAND'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND
BY EXCLUDING PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF THE
MCDONALDS EMPLOYEE, MRj. ELLISTON.
Before testifying, Mr. Howland moved the trial court to
exclude his prior convictions (R. 246). Mr. Howland's prior record
included a 1976 conviction for attempted robbery, a third degree
felony and a 1976 conviction for attempted burglary, also a third
degree felony (R. 247). The trial court denied the motion and
allowed both convictions into evidence (R. 256).

Mr. Howland now

contends that the denial of the motion to [exclude evidence of prior
convictions constituted reversible errorfc^ythe trial court because
the prior convictions were neither more probative than prejudicial,
nor did they involve dishonesty or false Statements as required by
Rule 609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 609(a) provides:
Rule 609.
of crime.

Impeachment by evidence of conviction
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(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
In presenting her motion, defense counsel contended, under
subsection (a)(1), that Mr. Howland's prior convictions would be
more prejudicial than probative and that the court should therefore
exclude them (R. 246-50).

The State, however, argued that balancing

under Subsection (a)(1) was not required because Mr. Howland's
convictions were admissible under the subsection (a)(2) since they
were crimes involving dishonesty and false statements (R. 250-53).
While the trial court was not clear in its ruling as to which
subsection it relied on in admitting the convictions, the record
suggests that the court denied the motion based on subsection
(a)(2).

This conclusion is reached in part because the trial court

cited State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), which discussed the
dishonesty and false statements theory (R. 278-79).
Regardless of which 609(a) theory the trial court used to
admit the prior convictions, the Court committed reversible error
since neither subsection (a)(1) nor subsection (a)(2), allows the
admission of Mr. Howland's two 1976 convictions.
A.

MR. HOWLAND'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE NOT CRIMES
WHICH WERE MORE PROBATIVE THAN PREJUDICIAL AS
REQUIRED BY RULE 609(a)(1).

Rule 609(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows prior
convictions to be admissible as evidence to attack the credibility
- 14 -

of a witness if elicited from him or established by public record
during cross examination only if the crime is a felony and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.

State v. Banner/

717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), is the lead case on Rule 609(a)(1) and it
lays out five factors which are to be considered when balancing
probative value against prejudicial effect.

The five factors are:

[1] the nature of the crime, as Hearing on the character
for veracity of the witness.
[2]

the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction

[3] the similarity of the prior cfrime to the charged
crime, insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to
punish the accused as a bad person.
[4] the importance of credibility issues in determining
the truth in a prosecution tried without decisive
nontestimonial evidence . . .
[5] the importance of the accused's testimony as perhaps
warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of the
accused's character for veracity 1 . .
Banner, supra at 1334.
Mr. Howland's prior convictions, attempted robbery and
attempted burglary, do not bear on the character for veracity of the
witness any more than the crime of assault with intent to commit
rape did in Banner.

There the Utah Supreme Court stated that the

crime in question "sheds about the same li pht as any felony
involving moral turpitude."

Banner, supra at 1335.

said of Mr. Howland's prior convictions,

The same can be

(Neither attempted robbery

nor attempted burglary inherently reflect on a predisposition to
lie.

Both crimes involve taking something! not your own but have

- 15 -

expressly been ruled out as probative of an accused's character for
veracity*

(See Argument Point II* B., infra,)
Mr. Howland's prior convictions were both received in 1976,

roughly ten years from when he went to trial on the charge at issue
in this appeal.

The previous convictions in the Banner case were

eight and nine years prior to the conviction questioned there.

The

remoteness of the prior convictions was significant there and is
even more so here.

Under Rule 609(b) Mr. Howland's prior

convictions would be inadmissible except that the period of
incarceration is tolled.

Even considering the period Mr. Howland

served, he shows a seven year span (from 1979 to 1986) from the two
convictions and the one now being appealed.

Seven years is a

substantial period of time and tips the balancing in favor of
excluding the prior convictions.
Attempted robbery and attempted burglary are both
considered crimes of violence as outlined by Utah Code Ann.
§76-10-501(2)(e) and various other sections of the Code.

Aggravated

Assault is also a crime of violence and as such would indicate the
need to exclude the prior convictions.

As crimes of violence the

new charge was substantially similar to the prior crimes and could
have lead the jury to punish Mr. Howland as a bad and violent
person.

This factor requires balancing in favor of excluding the

prior convictions as well.
The importance of credibility issues in determining what
occurred in this case is paramount.

The story of what happened

between Mr. Howland and Mr. Elliston depends primarily upon the
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credibility of each witness.

By ruling as it did to allow evidence

of Mr. Howland's prior convictions while ex eluding evidence of Mr.
Elliston's prior convictions, the trial cou rt unfairly tipped the
balance in favor of the state in determinin g the credibility of
Howland's testimony as opposed to that of Mr. Elliston.
Mr. Howland's testimony was import ant and essential since
it explained the altercation between the two men as he saw it.
Because of the importance of Howland's test imony, the balance
between probative value and prejudicial efflect should have shifted
towards exclusion of the prior convictions.
As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Banner,
supra, the State has the burden of persuadiing the court that "the
probative value of admitting the convictions, as far as shedding
light on the defendant's credibility, outweighs the prejudicial
effect to the defendant."

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334.

As was the

case in Banner, in the present case, the state offered little
evidence that the convictions were more probative than prejudicial.
The State contended that Subsection (a)(2) controlled the question
as to whether Mr. Howland's prior convictions were admissible.
prosecutor stated:

"We need not determine|whether there is more

probative or more prejudicial" (R. 251).
The prosecutor then stated:
If the Court is inclined to look ^t it
differently, I would suggest to the Court that
even if one were to apply, and I suggest one
certainly need not do that in this instance, the
balancing test, that the jury has the right to
know and that this is sufficiently probative that
it outweighs any prejudicial effept. (R. 251).
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The

Thereafter/ the prosecutor cited several Utah cases which
were decided prior to Utah's adoption of Rule 609(a).

In State v.

Banner/ supraf the state relied on the same cases cited by the State
in the present case.2

in that casef the Utah Supreme Court pointed

out that the new Rules of Evidence "are to provide a fresh starting
place for the law of evidence in this state.

'Since the advisory

committee generally sought to achieve uniformity between Utah's
rules and the federal rulesr this Court looks to the interpretations
of the federal rules by the federal courts to aid in interpreting
the Utah rules.'

Since Rule 609 is the federal rule verbatim/ and

in light of the construction objections just noted/ we turn to the
federal decisions interpreting the rule to aid in deciding this
case."

State v. Banner/ supra at 1333-4.

To the extent that prior

opinions are inconsistent with Rule 609, they are overruled.
Banner, supra at 1334 n. 40.
Hence the State did not sustain its burden under Rule 609
(a)(1) of proving that evidence of Mr. Howland's prior convictions
was more probative than prejudicial.
In addition, the trial court's ruling failed to clearly
disclose not only under which subsection of 609(a) it was rulingf
but also failed to make explicit findings as to the basis of any

2

The state cited State v. McCumber/ 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980); State
v. Harless/ 459 P.2d 210 (Utah 1969); State v. Bennett/ 517 P.2d
1029 (Utah 1973); and Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); all
of which were argued by the State in Banner. This Court commented
on the use of the pre-Rule 609 cases stating: "It is particularly
significant that the prosecutor at argument on defendant's motion
below relied upon case law established prior to our adoption of Rule
609(a)." Banner/ 717 P.2d at 1334 n. 45.
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decision that the probative value of the convictions outweighed the
prejudicial effect of such convictions,

Su ch failure to make

explicit findings amounted to a failure to (properly exercise the
discretion given the trial court under Rulel 609(a)*

In footnote 43,

the Banner Court pointed out:
Our determination makes it unnecessary to address
whether the lack of explicit findings on the
record implies a failure to exercise the
discretion conferred upon the tri^l court by Rule
609 or whether the trial court must provide an
on-the-record explanation of its Rule 609
findings.
State v, Banner, supra at 1334.
The footnote further pointed out that in United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the ctourt stated that "it must
be obvious to any careful trial judge that an explicit finding in
the terms of the Rule can be of great utility, if indeed not
required, on appellate review."
omitted).

Id. at 356 n. 17 (citations

The trial court failed to outline any findings which

justified an (a)(1) ruling.
Because the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions
outweighed their probative effect and base£ on the state's failure
to sustain its burden of showing otherwise and the trial court's
failure to outline explicit findings under Rule 609(a), Mr.
Howland's prior convictions should not havte been admitted under
609(a)(1).
B.

MR. HOWLAND'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE NOT CRIMES
WHICH INVOLVED DISHONESTY OR FALSE STATEMENT
AS MEANT BY RULE 609(a)(2).

Rule 609(a)(2) concerns impeachmelnt by prior convictions
for offenses involving dishonesty or false statement.
- 19 -

The Utah

Supreme Court has yet to address what crimes qualify as crimes of
dishonesty or false statement since adopting the new rules and
beginning the "fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this
state."

State v. Banner/ supra at 1333 (Utah 1986).

However, as

the Utah rule is a verbatim replica of the federal rule, ample
federal case law exists to act as a guide.
The federal courts are not in complete agreement on what
constitutes "dishonesty or false statement,"3 but the better
reasoned cases strongly indicate that the attempted robbery and
attempted burglary convictions of Mr. Howland should not have been
admissible at trial.

In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C.

Cir. 1976), which the Utah Supreme Court cited in its recent
609(a)(1) State v. Banner decision, the circuit court discussed in
detail the legislative history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the
heated debate which spawned the formulation of the rule.

The Smith

court quoted the Conference Committee Report which stated:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement"
the Conference means crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing
on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
United States v. Smith, supra at 362, (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, pp. 6098, 7103).

Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion

discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding that

3

See generally, annot. Rule 609(a)(2): Convictions Admissible;
Crimes Involving Dishonesty, 39 ALR Fed. 596 §15.
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crimes of the type that Mr. Howland previously had been convicted of
committing would not qualify under the crimen falsi designation.
United States v. Smith, supra at 362-63.
Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light on
what Congress* intent was with regards to Rule 609(a)(2).

In a

statement from the court in United States v[. Millings, 535 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior convictions
of Mr. Howland, the court reasoned:
An intent to deceive or defraud is not an
element of either offense . . . . (Certainly we
cannot say that either offense, inl the language
of the Conference Committee, is "peculiarly
probative of credibility." Althoujgh it may be
argued that any willful violation of law. . .
evinces a lack of character and a disregard for
all legal duties, including the obligations of
an oath, Congress has not accepted that
expansive theory.
United States v. Millings, supra at 123.

The clear intent of

Congress was to limit the introduction of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes only to those crimes vfhich bear directly on a
witness1 propensity to not tell the truth.

Otherwise, one could

argue, as discounted in Millings, that any crime could be introduced
to impeach.

As the Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress

did not intend to adopt such an expanded position.
In United States v. Glenn, 667 F.£d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982),
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a ^howing of accompanying
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.
make such a showing.

The burden rests with the State to

Generally, the court observed that crimes of

violence, theft crimes, and crimes of stealth (as in the case at
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bar) do not involve dishonesty or false statement within the proper
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).
In United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir.
1978)f the court stated that dishonesty and false statement does not
include convictions for burglary or robbery (in the case at bar the
convictions are for attempted burglary and attempted robbery) since
the terms are used in a restrictive manner and are limited to those
prior convictions which manifest deceit/ untruthfulness, or
falsification which would demonstrate that the accused would be
likely to testify untruthfully.
Similarly/ the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction
for felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under
Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's
propensity to testify truthfully.

The court stated that felony

theft does not involve dishonesty or false statement of the
credibility—deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609 (a)(2).
Howard v. Gonzalesf 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981).
Mr. Howland's prior convictions do not demonstrate a
propensity to lie under oath.

They show no deceit or dishonesty as

contemplated by Congress in promulgating Rule 609(a)(2).
Accordingly/ the trial court committed reversible error in denying
the motion to exclude the convictions.

The conviction of Mr.

Howland for attempted aggravated assault should be reversed and the
case remanded back to the trial court for a new trial without the
admission of Mr. Howland's prior convictions.
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE IMPEACHMENT OF MR. ELLISTON
BY HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS.

Subsequent to denying Mr. Howland'is motion to exclude his
prior convictions, the trial court excluded the prior convictions of
the McDonalds employee, Mr. Elliston (R. 145-46).

Mr. Elliston's

prior record included a 1985 conviction for attempted burglary, a
Class A misdemeanor (R. 259, 275). The trial court's decision to
exclude the convictions of Mr. Elliston was inconsistent with its
decision regarding Mr. Howland's motion, was erroneous in and of
itself, and further prejudiced Mr. Howland violating his
constitutional rights of due process and a fair trial as guaranteed
by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Sections Seven[and Twelve of the Utah
Constitution.
Almost immediately after the trial court ruled that Mr.
Howlandfs prior convictions were admissible, apparently under the
609(a)(2) theory of dishonesty and false statement, defense counsel

r

called Mr. Elliston to the stand and attempted to impeach him by
introducing his prior convictions (R. 259).

The State objected to

the questioning and then a discussion off the record at the bench
ensued between the court and counsel (R. 259).
ultimately sustained the objection (R. 259[ ).

The trial court

Later in the case the

trial court raised the question again and the subsequent discussion
revealed the contents of the earlier side (bar discussion (R. 273-83)
Defense counsel stated:
That was my argument at the bench, Your Honor, in
regard to Mr. Elliston's conviction, that if the
Court concludes that a burglary i|s a crime of
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dishonesty then it doesnft matter whether it is a
felony or misdemeanor. And the fact that his
conviction is for a Class A misdemeanor does not
make it inadmissible.
(R. 275).

The two attorneys then restated their respective

positions (R. 275-82), and ultimately Judge Wilkinson ruled, stating:
Well, the Court is going to rule. The Court is
not going to allow you to go into it. I think
that the law, this Cintron case, does allow it.
But I am going to have to abide by the rules, and
sometimes they are technical. If the State had
not rested their case then I would allow it. But
with the State having rested their case I don't
think that I can allow you to bring that witness
back as your own witness and impeach. As I say,
it was still open, then it would be something
else. So that is the way I am going to rule.
(R. 282-83).
The trial court's ruling that the state has rested its case
thereby preventing defense counsel from calling Mr. Elliston as her
own witness is erroneous.

Such a ruling violates a basic

fundamental constitutional provision.

The rights of an accused in a

criminal trial to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call
witnesses in his own behalf are essential to due process and a fair
trial.

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).

A defendant

may always call a State's witness as his own; he is entitled to do
so and at times even required—such as when the inquiry is beyond
the scope of the direct exam.
1984).
witness.

See McCormick on evidence §26 (3d ed.

Once a party calls a witness, the party may impeach that
Rule 607 of the Utah Rules of Evidence addresses this

question and states:

"The credibility of a witness may be attacked

by any party, including the party calling him."
Moreover, the ruling of the trial court unfairly prejudiced
Mr. Howland in that the same legal basis—albeit error—allowed in
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his prior convictions but was not utilized to impeach the
credibility of Mr. Elliston.

The effect of the erroneous ruling was

to put before the jury a defendant with prior convictions telling
his story against the story of the State's witness appearing beyond
reproach though equally flawed with prior convictions.
A jury faced with making a determination of guilt or
innocence, is likely to favor the version of the person who stands
unblemished before them.

In this case, thej ruling of the trial

court prejudiced Mr. Howland as his blemish was exposed to the jury
while the blemish of Mr. Elliston was inappropriately excluded.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the prejudicial ruling of the
trial court and place both witnesses on equal footing before the
jury.
POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
ED IN FAILING TO
DISMISS THE CHARGE OE AG'
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.

After the State concluded its case, Mr. Howland moved the
trial court to dismiss the charge of aggravated assault (R. 242).
The trial court denied the motion (R. 245-46).

Mr. Howland now

contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it
denied that motion because the State had failed to present a prima
facie case.
To present a prima facie case of Aggravated assault the
State must prove each element of the crime^4

4

Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended) sets forth the standard
for conviction in criminal cases. That section provides: "A
defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed innocent until each
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be
acquitted."
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§76-5-103 outlines the crime of aggravated assault and identifies
the requisite elements; it reads:
(1)

A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means
or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 lists the elements of assault as:
(a)
(b)

An attempt, with unlawful force
to do bodily injury to another;
A threat, accompanied by a show
force or violence, to do bodily
another.

or violence,
or
of immediate
injury to

Since no one sustained serious bodily injury in this case, the
State's prima facie case must show evidence of a threat accompanied
by an immediate show of force or violence and the use of a deadly
weapon as part of that assault.
According to the prosecution witnesses, the alleged threat
occurred near the dumpster and consisted of a statement that in the
future, Mr. Howland would harm Mr. Elliston's family.

Such a threat

did not suggest that Mr. Howland intended to do any harm to Mr.
Elliston at that time.
After Mr. Howland allegedly made the threat, a scuffle
between Mr. Elliston and Mr. Howland ensued.

Mr. Elliston testified

that Mr. Howland made a motion "like he was going to hit me, and so
I hit him" (R. 167). Mr. Elliston also testified that he struck Mr.
Howland in the face before Mr. Howland could hit him and that Mr.
Howland actually never made contact with Mr. Elliston despite Mr.
Elliston hitting Mr. Howland four or five times in the face (R.
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183-84).

The State later admitted that Mr.lElliston actually had

taken the offensive position after Mr. Howland made a fist and
pulled it back to strike Mr. Elliston (R. 243).
Mr. Howland did not use a weapon at the dumpster and, in
fact retreated from the situation after being struck in the face
four or five times, thereby clarifying that he did not intend to
carry out any action which Mr. Elliston might have perceived as a
threat (R. 50-52).

By running away from the situation, Mr. Howland

attenuated his statement and the scuffle at the dumpster from any
subsequent activity.

Mr. Howland was twenty feet away from the

dumpster before Mr. Elliston started to follow him (R. 189). While
Mr. Elliston claimed that he feared Mr. Howland was going after his
family, he acknowledged that Mr. Howland had no idea where his
family lived (R. 45-46).

Hence, Mr. Howland's action in running

from the dumpster established that the perdeived threat and scuffle
at the dumpster were distinct and separate (from the incident in
front of Smith's.
After Mr. Howland ran from the dunjpster area, Mr. Elliston
instigated phase two.

Mr. Elliston chased Mr. Howland, grabbed him

from behind, placed him in a headlock, and wrestled him to the
ground (R. 189-90).

Mr. Kilburn approached the pair and saw Mr.

Howland who Mr. Elliston was holding in a headlock, with his hand on
a knife in its sheath (R. 211-12).
arm.

Mr. Ki][lburn grabbed Howland's

While Kilburn claimed that the knife was out of the sheath at

that time, Howland testified that the knif£ was still in the sheath
and that when Kilburn grabbed his arm, the knife came out of the
sheath (R. 270-272).

Howland did not make a motion to use the knife
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(R. 217-18).

Elliston was unaware until after the altercation ended

that Mr. Howland had a knife (R. 192).

The State attempted to

establish that Mr. Howland was the perpetrator of an aggravated
assault by combining the events.

The prosecutor argued, "It is

still an aggravated assault because there is a threat accompanied by
a show of force or violence.

The mere fact of the fist and pulling

the arm back together with the use of the deadly weapon" (R. 244).
In one sentence the state attempted to bootstrap the events by the
dumpster to the grabbing of the knife by the witness.
The removal of the knife in an upward motion was not done
in the immediate time and space of any perceived threat and was
sufficiently attenuated from the alleged threat by Mr. Howland's
retreat that it cannot be bootstrapped to that threat to make the
combined incident an aggravated assault.

At the time Mr. Howland

reached for the knife, he had been hit in the face five times
without sustaining one blow against Mr. Elliston, chased after
running from the dumpster, kneed, and held in a headlock.

As

previously argued, even if Mr. Elliston was attempting to effectuate
a citizen's arrest as he claimed, that arrest was unlawful and he
was using excessive force in carrying it out.

Mr. Howland reached

for the knife in a defensive reaction to an unlawful arrest and
excessive use of force.

The withdrawal from the dumpster area by

Mr. Howland and his running away, as well as the lapse in time and
span of distance, prohibited an interpretation that a threat was
authored and accompanied by an "immediate" show of force and use of
a deadly weapon as required by the statute.
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Accordingly, the trial court should have granted Mr.
Howland's motion to dismiss the charge.

The trial court committed

reversible error when it denied that motion and this Court should
therefore reverse the lower court's decision and remand with
instructions to dismiss the charges.
POINT IV.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO FLIGHT
AFTER THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME.

At the close of the evidence, the [trial court gave the jury
the following instruction:
INSTRUCTION NO. 22
Intentional flight by a defendant
immediately after the commission of a crime is
not sufficient in itself to establish guilt; but
is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by
the jury in the light of all other evidence in
the case in determining guilt or ijnnocence.
Whether or not evidence of flightjshows a
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if
any, to be attached to any such evidence are
matters exclusively within the province of the
jury.
Defense counsel objected to such instruction (R. 337),

The

instruction was not based on evidence introduced at trial, was
misleading to the jury and served as a comment on the evidence.
Instructions given to the jury mu^t be based on the
evidence introduced at trial.

See State vj. Pacheco, 495 P.2d 808

(Utah 1972); State v. Marasco, 17 P.2d 919 |, 923-24 (Utah 1933).

In

State v. Wrenn, 584 P.2d 1231 (Idaho 1978) |, the Idaho Supreme Court
found that the departure of the defendants was not "indicative of
flight, but rather is consistent with the tact the defendants were
transients."

That court stated:
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For departure to take on the legal significance
of flight, there must be other circumstances
present and unexplained which, together with the
departure reasonably justify an inference that it
was done with a consciousness of guilt and in an
effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution based
on that guilt. Id. at 1234.
That Court held that giving a flight instruction was erroneous and
reversed the case.
In the present case, the evidence did not support the
giving of a flight instruction.

Assuming, arguendo, that an

attempted aggravated assault occurred, it did not occur until the
knife was pulled from its sheath.
time and subsequently arrested.

Howland was restrained at that
No flight or departure occurred

after the knife was pulled.
The only departure or "flight" in this case occurred when
Mr. Howland ran from the dumpster area.

As previously outlined, the

only violation which had possibly occurred at that time was a
trespass, a violation which was not charged or presented to the
jury.

Although arguably flight might be considered in determining

whether Mr. Howland committed a trespass or any other crime at the
dumpster, it was irrelevant to the issue of whether he committed an
aggravated assault.

Instructing the jury in this manner served to

confuse rather than clarify for the jury since no "flight" in the
legal sense occurred after the alleged commission of the offense
charged.
In addition, instructing the jury in this manner suggested
that a "flight" rather than a retreat from the situation occurred.
Mr. Howland did exactly as Mr. Elliston requested and retreated from
the dumpster area.

Howland's retreat was a reasonable, positive
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response to the situation at the dumpster.

The Court's instruction

on flight takes this reasonable/ positive a let of retreating from the
situation and twists it into a negative act ion to be considered in
determining whether Mr. Howland committed aln aggravated assault.
The instruction focuses on and alerts the j ury's attention to an act
which is irrelevant in determining whether Mr. Howland committed an
aggravated assault since any alleged aggravated assault did not
occur until after Mr. Howland retreated frqm the dumpster area.
Flight instructions are disfavored in many jurisdictions
and have been subject to controversy and conflicting opinions as to
their propriety.

See State v. Jeffersony 5 24 P.2d 248/ 251 (Wash.

App. 1974); People v. Rogers, 690 P.2d 886,| 889 (Colo. App. 1984);
State v. Wrenn, 584 P.2d 1231 (Id. 1978).

The basic argument

against flight instructions in general/ is that they serve as
improper comment on the evidence.

State v^ Jefferson/ supra at 251;

People v. Rogers, supra at 889.
As the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in State v. Balesy
675 P.2d 572 (Utah 1983)/ flight instructions have been subject to
controversy and differing opinions among various jurisdictions.

In

that casef the Court pointed out that "(a)jthough our cases affirm
the admissibility of evidence of flight (citations omitted)/ the
circumstances that will support a jury instruction on flight and the
content of such an instruction present questions not yet answered by
this Court."
In

Bales/ the Court found that th&re was evidence to

justify a flight instruction and that the first paragraph of the
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instruction given was acceptable but "(i)t should. . . have been
incorporated two further ideas"

State v. Bales, supra at 575.

A flight instruction will not be completely free
from criticism unless it advises the jury that
there may be reasons for flight fully consistent
with innocence and that even if consciousness of
guilt is inferred from flight it does not
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime
charged.
State v. Bales, supra at 575.
The Court rejected the second paragraph of the flight
instruction based on its assertion that flight constitutes an
implied admission of guilt.
The instruction given in this case was similar to that
approved in State v. Gonzales, 517 P.2d 547 (Utah 1973).

However,

it did not expressly "advise the jury that there may be reasons for
flight fully consistent with innocence" or that "even if
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged" State v.
Bales, supra at 575. In light of the above requirements set forth in
Bales, Mr. Howland urges this Court to reject the content of the
instruction given, even though substantially similar to that in
Gonzales, since it did not clarify for the jury that other reasons
for flight may exist or that flight does not necessarily reflect
guilt of the crime charged.
Such additional ideas are especially important in this case
where no evidence of departure occurred after the knife was pulled
from its sheath; as previously outlined the only departure occurred
when Mr. Howland retreated from the dumpster.

The reason for such

retreat could be response to Mr. Elliston's request he leave, an
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attempt to get away from the swinging arms of Elliston or various
other reasons.

As the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Bales, the

Court should have instructed the jury that other reasons for
departure may exist.
In addition, the jury should have been advised that flight
does not necessarily reflect guilt of the cli[rime charged.

As

previously outlined, the only possible viol<lation at the dumpster was
an infraction trespass.

By not advising the jury that if a flight

occurred it did not necessarily reflect consciousness of guilt of
the crime charged, the instruction could confuse the jury into
thinking that if it decided Mr. Howland ran because he felt guilty,
that feeling of guilt would suggest he committed an aggravated
assault rather than some other crime.

Thi^ clarification was

necessary in this case where any flight or departure occurred prior
to the crime alleged in the information.
The trial court committed reversible error in giving
Instruction No. 22 to the jury.

Where there is no evidence on which

to base a flight instruction and the jury could have determined as a
result of that instruction that the defendant's departure was a
flight and evidence of guilt, giving the instruction amounts to
reversible error.

See State v. Wrenn, suppa at 1234.

Gallegos v.

People, 444 P.2d 267, 270 (Colo. 1968).
In State v. Pacheco, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the trial court committed reversible error where the Court gave
the jury an instruction on aiding and abetting even though there was
no evidence of aiding and abetting.

The qacheco Court stated that

it:
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seems almost axiomatic that instructions must
bear a relationship to evidence reflected in the
record, and we cannot enjoy the luxury of
sustaining a conviction on trite aphorism
unsupported by any kind of evidence.
In State v. Bales, supra at 576, the Utah Supreme Court
held that giving a flight instruction where the content of the
second paragraph was improper did not constitute reversible error
because the magnitude of the other evidence "provided an ample basis
for conviction".

In that case, unlike the present case, the Court

found that there was evidence which justified the Court giving a
flight instruction.
In the present case, as previously outlined, the evidence
did not justify a flight instruction.

Because the instruction was

given, the jury could have concluded that a flight rather than a
departure occurred and used that determination in assessing Mr.
Howland's guilt as to the crime charged.

As previously outlined

flight instructions in general are disfavored because they draw
attention to the act and serve as a comment on the evidence.

In the

present case, where jury confusion could easily arise due to the
attenuation between the incident at the dumpster and the scuffle in
front of Smith f s, the flight instruction drew the two incidents
together, and suggested that Mr. Howland did something improper in
retreating from the dumpster area.

This instruction, coupled with

the jury's knowledge that Mr. Howland had a prior conviction (and
their lack of knowledge as to Elliston's prior conviction) suggested
that Mr. Howland had committed a crime in this instance.
In addition, because of the attenuation between the
incident at the dumpster and the incident in front of Smith's, and
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the differing versions testified to by Elli^ton and Howland, very
little evidence that Mr. Howland committed an aggravated assault
existed.

Accordingly, the trial court commlltted reversible error :

giving this specific flight instruction where the evidence did not
support a flight instruction.
POINT V.

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
COMMITTED AT TRIAL PREJUDICED MR. HOWLAND
SO AS TO DENY HIM A FAIR TRIAL.

Even if this Court finds that none| of the above errors
individually require reversal/ the cumulati ve effect of the errors
so prejudiced Mr. Howland's right to a fair trial that the
conviction should be reversed.

In Gooden v . State, 617 P.2d 248,

250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) the court stated:
When a review of the entire recorq reveals
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice
the rights of a defendant and wheije an
accumulation of errors denies a dQ fendant a fair
trial, the case will be reversed, even though one
of the errors standing alone, wou][d not be ample
to justify reversal.
(citation omitted).
1955).

See also State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323 (Utah

The errors committed at trial demonstrate that Mr. Howland

did not receive a fair trial; accordingly, this Court should find
that the accumulation of errors warrant a reversal of Mr. Howland's
conviction, or in the alternative, a new trial.
As previously outlined, the erroneous admission of evidence
of Mr. Howland's prior convictions coupledj with the failure to admit
Mr. Elliston's prior convictions left the [jury with the impression
that Mr. Howland was less credible than MrL. Elliston.

This

impression, coupled with a flight instruct [ion which suggests that
Mr. Howland did something negative in retreating from the situation,
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further suggested that Mr. Howland did something wrong in this
situation.

These errors, coupled with the additional errors set

forth above, denied Mr. Howland his right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
James R. Howland, requests this Court to reverse his conviction for
aggravated robbery and remand this case to the trial court with an
order for either dismissal of the charges or a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this <£6

day of June, 1987.

LISA J. R£MAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, LISA J. REMAL, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Guilding;, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this ? S

day of June, 1987.

LISA J. kEMAL
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED by

this

June, 1987.
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(COURT
IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL] DisjjrjRICTric
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y i STATE
VTE OF UTAH

1241986
Clerk 3rd Di3i Cc

THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT) TO
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL
Case Noj
Count N4
Honorab e

i

Clerk _ j
Reporter]
Bailiff
Date .

Defendant.

HOMER F, WILKINSON
G A CHtLDS
At AN SMITH

otjbivFm?

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
• The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. Th
r reason why sentence
plea ofjgu£lfy;D plea
should not be imposed, and defenda
of no contest; of the offense of
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ready fj
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ve offense,
jntenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail,
. months;
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'and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of %o<*!VU ;
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $

.to

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
• such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)
D

are hereby dismissed.

XTDeU
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (detail)
(iFjail) si
sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision pj^he^Chj^fAgent, Utah Stajte Department of Adult Probation and
Parole for the period of (FYUf^
D Defendant is remanded into the^custody of the Sheriff of Skit Lake County, to be confined and
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with thi|s Judgment and Commitment.
• Commitment shall issue
DATED th i s ^ S Z l day of
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Defense Counsel
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CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
XZt'yius
fual and dinarv condtjlorts required by the Dept. of Adult Probation
te^Serve
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D Pay a fine in the amount of $
D at a rate,
e determined by the Depa
Parole; or Q at the rate of
D Pay restitution in the amount of $
; or D in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adi
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
; or • at a rate to be determined by
Jtne Department of Adult Probation and Par$&S
J J
y Enter, participate in, and complete any
sUWldArprogram, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
D Participate in and complete any • educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D'with
. training • as directed by the Department of Adult
Participate in and complete a n y .
Probation and Parole; or D with
Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
Submit to drug testing.
Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
• Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
D Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
to Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
D Maintain full-time employment.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
I
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
• Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
i n d Parole ^
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days in jail.
• Defendant is to commit no crimes.
for a review of this sentence.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on

jpOLWTyJUDGE
Page - ^ L O f

D

g T AH-o-xoN^D^r
Deputy CtorK

ADDENDUM B

LISA J. REMAL (2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
SaJt Lake County, Utah

SEP & * 1986
H D i x o M j U ^ ^ « f k 3 r d O i 8 t Court

By

D*ontv Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case Nol. CR86-1056
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON

JAMES R. HOWLAND,
Defendant.
MOTION

COMES NOW the Defendant above-named, by and through his
attorney, LISA J. REMAL, and hereby moves thiss Court to dismiss
the above-entitled case against the defendant on the following
grounds:
That the defendant's arrest was in violation of his constitutional
rights under the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

The basis for this

claim is the defendant's belief that the citizen who placed the
defendant under citizen's arrest had either rio basis for said arrest
or at most, was placing the defendant under arrest for an infraction,
a category of offense for which no jail can be imposed and, therefore,
no arrest can be made.

The defendant, therefore, had a right to

resist the unlawful arrest.
DATED this

?L

day of September, 1986

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

^Q.fcwjf

LISA J./REMAL
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the above-entitled
matter will come on regularly for hearing on the

day of

, 1986, at the hour of

.m., before

the Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON.
DATED this

ZC

day of September, 1986.

J\fyL^\.knstl
LISA J. REMAL

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Notice
of Hearing to the Office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this £(,

day of September

J
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ADDENDUM C

76-8-305. Interference with peace officer making lawful
arrest.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if helhas knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or another and interferes with such arrest or detention by use of force [or by use of any weapon.

